Critical resource sharing among multiple entities in a processing system is inevitable, which in turn calls for the presence of appropriate authentication and access control mechanisms. Generally speaking, these mechanisms are implemented via trusted so ware "policy checkers" that enforce certain high level application-speci c "rules" to enforce a policy. Whether implemented as operating system modules or embedded inside the application ad hoc, these policy checkers expose additional a ack surface in addition to the application logic. In order to protect application so ware from an adversary, modern secure processing platforms, such as Intel's So ware Guard Extensions (SGX), employ principled hardware isolation to o er secure so ware containers or enclaves to execute trusted sensitive code with some integrity and privacy guarantees against a privileged so ware adversary. We extend this model further and propose using these hardware isolation mechanisms to shield the authentication and access control logic essential to policy checker so ware. While relying on the fundamental features of modern secure processors, our framework introduces productive so ware design guidelines which enable a guarded environment to execute sensitive policy checking code -hence enforcing application control ow integrity -and a ord exibility to the application designer to construct appropriate high-level policies to customize policy checker so ware.
INTRODUCTION
Technology plays a major role in shaping various di erent aspects of our lives in the modern digital world. We, as users, interact with hundreds of digital devices in our day-to-day lives such as mobile devices, electronic households, medical equipments, automobiles, media players and many more. One way or the other, these devices access certain resources that are shared among various entities, be it other users or internal management modules of the system. For instance, in a cloud se ing, users share physical storage and computational resources to store their private data and perform arbitrary computations on this data. Authentication and access control mechanisms are vital components of such systems that verify a user's/task's identity and regulate its requests to access certain system resources respectively.
Authentication and access control are typically quite interrelated. In general, a user is granted or denied permission to access a certain resource by rst authenticating its identity and then looking up an access permissions list corresponding to this particular user. Common authentication mechanisms include password based and public key based schemes [26] . Password based systems require an initial (secure) setup phase before the authentication phase, whereas public key based systems use a trusted certi cation authority. Other advanced mechanisms incorporate multiple authentication factors, e.g., by exploiting physiological biometrics (iris, ngerprints, hand, retinal), behavioral characteristics (voice, typing pa ern) [11] , and human psychology to understand and predict human behavior [21] .
In modern applications, typically the authentication and access control mechanisms are implemented via trusted so ware "policy checker" modules that enforce certain high level applicationspeci c "rules" to enforce a policy. Preventing any malicious manipulations to an application's control ow is crucial for the overall program integrity, as well as for any so ware based authentication/access control policies to be e ective. Control ow manipulations in the untrusted (i.e., potentially buggy) parts of the application code are possible by exploiting any memory safety violations, e.g., through a bu er over ow vulnerability etc. Whereas parts of the application trusted to be bug-free, including the policy checker so ware, are not vulnerable to such a acks. Nevertheless, substantial amount of research has been done on the subject of detecting and protecting against so ware-level memory safety violations at instruction-by-instruction level ne granularity as well as checkpointing based coarse granularity. Among the various proposals are so ware only approaches [1, 3, [18] [19] [20] and partially or fully hardware-assisted approaches [5, 8, 24] .
In spite of the policy checker so ware being trusted, a fundamental problem that still persists is that this so ware is vulnerable to privileged so ware a acks. For instance, a compromised operating system or hypervisor (that runs at a higher privilege level than the application -hence called a privileged so ware) having full control over the system resources can not only learn the application's sensitive information [25] , but also tamper with its data and/or manipulate its control ow to bypass the policy checking so ware. State-of-the-art secure processors, such as Intel SGX [17] and Sanctum [6] , o er hardware assisted secure containers or enclaves to run the sensitive application code (e.g., policy checker) in a protected environment. Although this paradigm protects the application against a bunch of privileged so ware a acks, yet it does not enforce the "correct" execution ordering of enclaves from the application's perspective. In other words, the application's control ow can still be manipulated at enclaves level granularity, resulting in crucial policy violations. For example, a compromised OS could completely bypass the policy checker enclave and allow the adversary an unauthorized access to the system resources.
In this paper, we introduce an application so ware design framework based on modern secure processors which, in a nutshell, uses an enclaved policy checker engine to manage the capabilities of the rest of the system. Given that the policy engine is a persistent trusted component, it o ers a powerful security property: trustworthy ordering of enclaves' executions in the presence of compromised privileged so ware. In our approach, the application designer wraps the policy checker code into a separate policy enclave along with creating several other enclaves for sensitive parts of the application. e policy enclave, depending upon the application, administers corresponding rules for authentication and access control, as well as veri es the enclaves' execution ow at each step. While o ering traditional isolation guarantees, the proposed approach ensures that the policy enclave is invoked upon all "sensitive" transitions of the program; particularly before each entry to a regular enclave. In addition to preventing the privileged so ware from circumventing the policy checks, our framework o ers the application designer a global picture of the application execution state (through the policy enclave) which in turn provides the designer a much richer set of information to design policy checker so ware.
BACKGROUND
e a acks that can be performed on a computer system can broadly be classi ed into physical a acks and so ware/remote a acks. To launch physical a acks, the adversary having the physical access to the computer system might tamper with the system or exploit its physical implementation to perform an authorized operation or learning secret information. In contrast, remote adversaries can only launch so ware a acks which might involve executing potentially malicious so ware at the victim system and/or accessing the victim's con dential data. Generally, a remote adversary is more common than a physical adversary since usually the user either owns the system (e.g. a personal computer) or the computing infrastructure (e.g. a cloud server) is managed by trusted parties. With this model in mind, we only focus on the remote adversaries in this paper. Adversaries having physical access to the computer system are out of scope of this work. 
Trusted Hardware
In the presence of physical adversaries, the privacy of user's sensitive data becomes a serious concern. To address this challenge, various trusted-hardware based secure processor architectures have been proposed in the literature [10, 13-17, 22, 23] . A trustedhardware platform receives user's encrypted data, which is decrypted and computed upon inside the trusted boundary, and nally the encrypted results of the computation are sent to the user. e trusted-hardware is assumed to be tamper-resistant, i.e. an adversary cannot probe the processor chip to learn any information.
In addition to protecting against certain physical adversaries described above, secure processors also introduced the notion of secure containers based on two important properties, Hardware Isolation and A estation. Secure containers also called enclaves can be used to defend against certain so ware adversaries. For example, the XOM architecture [13] [14] [15] uses isolated containers to execute sensitive code on the user's data without trusting the OS. Aegis [22, 23] makes use of a trusted security kernel to isolate each container from other so ware running on the computer system by con guring the page tables used for address translation. e security kernel is a subset of a typical OS kernel, and handles virtual memory management, processes, and hardware exceptions.
is leads us to give the reader a quick background of two stateof-the-art secure processor architectures: an industrial agship architecture Intel SGX and an academic architecture Sanctum with a similar API. We will be using these systems as the underlying hardware for our proposed framework that ts both these architectures equally well.
Intel SGX
Intel's So ware Guard Extentions (SGX) [17] follows Bastion's [4] approach of having the untrusted OS manage the page tables; and also adapts the ideas from Aegis and XOM to multi-core processors (having a shared, coherent last-level cache) by introducing the concept of enclaves. An enclave is a protected environment that contains the code and data of a security-sensitive computation. Each enclave's environment is isolated from the untrusted so ware outside the enclave, as well as from other enclaves. SGX maintains isolation by se ing aside a memory region, called the Processor Reserved Memory (PRM). e CPU protects the PRM from all nonenclave memory accesses, including kernel, hypervisor and system management mode accesses, and DMA accesses from peripherals. PRM holds an Enclave Page Cache (EPC) which contains information regarding enclave's code and data. An enclave is allowed to only access its own information stored in the EPC.
Intel SGX also provides the a estation capabilities for authentication purposes. A estation allows an enclave to a est its execution environment to other enclaves on the same system platform (Local A estation), and also to the entities outside the platform (Remote Attestation). Remote a estation is a method by which an SGX enabled processor authenticates its hardware and so ware con guration to a remote host. It is achieved with the help of a oting Enclave, a specially designed enclave that uses an a estation key to sign the execution "report" and allows the remote party to verify the signature using a public key. Figure 1 shows how the enclaves in the SGX architecture are created, initialized, and loaded. It also explains how, with the use of speci ed instructions, an application designer can context switch between enclaves and/or non-enclave code. e following instructions (embedded as micro-code in the ISA), represented in Figure 1 , explain the major transitions during a SGX enclave's life cycle.
• ECREATE: Creates a unique instance of an enclave.
• EADD: Adds pages and thread control structures into the enclave.
• EEXTEND: Generates a cryptographic hash of the content of the enclave.
• EINIT: Initializes the enclave and marks it ready to be used.
• EENTER, ERESUME: Enters the enclave or resumes a er context switching/exiting. • EEXIT, AEX: Exits the enclave synchronously, or asynchronously.
• EREMOVE: Refers to a tear-down of an enclave as it deallocates the page from the EPC permanently.
• EREPORT: Application enclave calls this instruction to generate a report structure for a desired target enclave for local a estation.
• EGETKEY: Used by the target enclave to retrieve the report key generated by the application enclave.
As complementary mechanisms, SGX also implements memory integrity veri cation and encryption of the memory.
Sanctum
Sanctum [6] follows SGX's API and o ers the same promise of strong provable isolation of so ware running concurrently and sharing resources. It is built on top of an open source implementation of Rocket RISC-V core. Sanctum is a hardware so ware co-design that introduces a small trusted so ware security monitor that e ectively extends the ISA as in SGX. Furthermore, Sanctum introduces nominal hardware extensions:
• DMA Tranfer Filtering: A protection circuitry to prevent peripherals accessing enclave's memory regions.
• Cache Address Shi er: An additional hardware to circularly shi the Physical Page Number to the right by a As discussed in section 2.2, SGX hardware ensures security via its high privileged microcode which extends to the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA). Updates to the microcode in SGX can only be made through Intel. In contrast, Sanctum uses an open-sourced security monitor implementation which is provided at the machine level (highest privilege level) in RISC-V. For updating the security monitor, Sanctum employs a bootstrapping mechanism which allows a user to write and update its own security monitor. All layers of Sanctum's trusted computing base (TCB) are open-sourced at www.github.com/pwnall/sanctum.
Unlike SGX, each Sanctum enclave is responsible for its own memory management with respect to page swapping between reserved enclave memory and the untrusted DRAM. e security monitor provides API calls to the OS and enclaves for DRAM region allocation and enclave management, and also guards sensitive registers, such as the page table base register. e life cycle of a Sanctum enclave is very similar to that of its SGX counterpart, as shown in Figure 1 . Sanctum's so ware a estation process relies on mailboxes, a simpli ed version of SGX's crypto based local a estation mechanism (EGETKEY and EREPORT ) that uses key-derivation and MAC algorithms. Enclave mailboxes are stored in metadata regions and isolated from other mailboxes, which cannot be accessed by any so ware/OS other than the security monitor. In Sanctum, an enclave (say A) can invoke a secure inter-enclave messaging service to send an accept message monitor call to specify the mailbox that will receive the message and the identity of the enclave (say B) that is expected to send the message. e sending enclave (B) performs a send message call that speci es the identity of the receiving enclave and a mailbox within that enclave. e security monitor delivers messages to mailboxes that expect them. It noti es the enclave (A) that it has received a message, which issues a read message call to the security monitor that moves the message from the mailbox into enclave's memory.
Unlike SGX, Sanctum protects against an important class of additional so ware a acks that infer private information through a program's cache access pa erns. It employs the concept of cache partitioning based on page coloring. Sanctum shows that isolation of concurrent so ware modules (which relies on caching DRAM regions in distinct sets) provides strong security guarantees against a subtle so ware threat model at the cost of small performance overhead.
Promises vs. Limitations
As we discussed so far, modern secure processors o er strong isolated environments to securely execute sensitive code in the presence of strong so ware adversaries. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight what secure processors do not promise! In particular, SGX/Sanctum only guarantee that each individual enclave is securely and correctly executed, and this can be veri ed through the hash digest or so called report of the enclave. However, in an application with multiple enclaves having interdependencies, it is the programmer's responsibility to not only verify (via enclave reports) that each enclave has executed the expected code on the expected/correct inputs, but also that the global order in which the enclaves are executed is consistent with the application design. e la er condition is equally important for the overall integrity and security of the application.
For instance, Figure 2 shows a toy example of a program with three enclaves A, B and C. Under the normal behavior of the program, enclave A provides some input credentials x to B which computes an authentication function f on x. If the authentication is successful, i.e. f (x) = 1, only then enclave C is allowed to execute (and then access some critical system resource). In case of authentication failure, i.e. f (x) = 0, the control is returned back to enclave A without executing C. Now, a strong adversary, who can alter the global ordering of enclaves' execution, can do the following: it can skip the authentication step performed by enclave B and directly execute C gaining an unauthorized access to the corresponding resource, or it can rst execute C and then perform the (useless) authentication step as shown in Figure 2 . Hence it is crucial to maintain the global execution ordering of the application modules. At least for now, it is out of scope for secure processors to enforce such invariants by themselves. Although these processors provide enclaves the capability of a esting themselves to other enclaves (local a estation) if requested by them, it is the programmer's job to actually ask for the a estation while switching between the modules/enclaves to ensure ordering consistency.
THREAT MODEL
We assume an insidious so ware adversary capable of subverting privileged system so ware (operating system or hypervisor), recon guring so ware-programmable devices (such as a DMA controller), and actively seeking to subvert a sensitive application executing on a modern "secure processor" system. e adversary is expected to a empt to mount a privilege escalation a ack (in the context of sensitive so ware employing trusted and enclaved authentication/access control mechanism) in order to achieve behavior that violates the application's policy.
Denial of service, however, is not in the scope of this work, as a privileged adversary controls resource allocation, and may easily deny resources to a victim application. Also not modeled is an adversary seeking to infer private information from direct or indirect side e ects of the execution of the sensitive so ware.
e adversary is assumed to have full control of the OS/Hypervisor, and is able to arbitrarily orchestrate system resources, computation, and launch or destroy processes including enclaves at will. e secure processor is assumed to correctly implement the enclave primitive, consisting of a process with private memory with integrity and privacy guarantees (an adversary is unable to modify the text or data of an enclave, and is unable to tamper with the execution of an enclave other than to deny it service, destroy it, or falsify untrusted inputs).
In order to compromise the sensitive application, the a acker may directly manipulate the application's control ow (e.g., by exploiting a vulnerability in the application code), or via a privileged a ack whereby malicious system so ware violates its own process abstraction, undermining the integrity of the program and/or its data.
e application is assumed to be designed in accordance with the principles outlined in this manuscript: a modular system whereby each module is responsible for some well-de ned task, e.g., collecting clients' requests, policy checking, database access etc. Following the standard model of secure processors, we consider that the system is initially in a safe state, following a trusted bootstrapping process. It is assumed that the application code is provided by a trusted so ware vendor, and the various enclaved code is authenticated via the enclaves' measurement (signature) SIGSTRUCT through the vendor's veri cation key VK. e system is assumed to correctly implement enclave measurement, whereby the measurement of a sealed enclave is descriptive of its state. In the case of SGX, incorrect or extraneous pages loaded by an adversary via EADD alter the enclave's measurement created by EEXTEND and are detectable during a estation.
In order to minimize the trusted computing base, the application designer must not enclave the entire sensitive application, and instead employ several collaborative enclaves, as described in Section 4. e reason being security concerns -as large, buggy trusted code is not trustworthy -and performance considerations since enclave memory is limited and fragmented on systems such as SGX. In a system with multiple communicating enclaves the adversary is assumed capable of tampering with the order of enclave execution, mount replay a acks, and tamper with enclave communications (by dropping, reordering, or replaying messages, as enclaves are authenticated), as described in Section 2.4 (cf. Figure 2) . is work fully trusts enclave so ware modules and assumes that the modules are correctly implemented. is work does not guard against so ware vulnerabilities (bu er over ows and other examples where an application violates its own security) in critical enclaved modules. 
Application

PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Now that we have provided su cient background regarding the functioning of secure processors and discussed our threat model, we move forward and present our proposed methodology through which these secure processors can be leveraged to o er concrete guarantees for authentication and access control schemes.
e Big Picture
4.1.1 Types of Application Enclaves. As mentioned earlier, the application designer is expected to design the application code in a modular fashion in order to perform di erent subtasks of the application. Since the application is designed to run on a secure processor, it is vital that all the sensitive modules of the application -such as authentication, access control, database accessing -are wrapped inside secure enclaves (also termed as "regular" enclaves in this paper). In our model, one speci c responsibility of the programmer is to implement a centralized policy checker module for not only all the authentication and access control jobs, but also to enforce/verify the global execution ordering of various modules.
is module must be wrapped inside a secure enclave, called policy enclave.
An
Alternative Approach: Distributed FSM. In order to guarantee that the identity of a user/task requesting a certain resource is properly authenticated and proper access control checks are performed by the policy checker module, the policy enclave must be invoked accordingly. Moreover, since a compromised OS can control the order in which modules/enclaves are executed, it can completely bypass the policy enclave or execute it in an incorrect order to avoid the access control checks and hence perform an unauthorized access (cf. Figure 2) . Since the secure processors in their current form do not enforce "correct" execution orderings of enclaves, this problem might not be detected through individual enclaves' reports. To counter this problem, the programmer may implement a "distributed" nite state machine (FSM) such that each subsequent enclave is provided with the report of the previous previous enclave in order to ensure the correct execution and enclave ordering. However, distributing the FSM implementation in this manner introduces much higher complexity for the programmer, and also makes it harder to reason about the security properties o ered by such a scheme.
Proposed
Approach: Centralized FSM. In order to address this issue and provide the programmer the exibility of having a centralized ordering/policy checker FSM, we propose to design the application such that it always invokes the policy enclave before entering any regular enclave. e policy enclave is created at the start of the application, and being part of the application, it is created and initialized in the same fashion as the regular enclaves. A high level interaction between the policy enclave and the regular enclaves of the application is shown in Figure 3 . Each time a regular enclave A is entered, the application calls the policy enclave P which is provided with a report of the last enclave executed. e policy enclave performs vital access control checks based on the available permission list, as well as veri es the provided report. A successful veri cation also ensures a correct enclave execution order (cf. Section 4.2 for details). Finally, P creates its own report and sends it to enclave A, which veri es it in a similar manner upon entry. Upon exit, enclave A sends its latest report to policy enclave for future use. is sequence continues until the application terminates with the execution of the nal regular enclave B which a ests itself to the remote client via remote a estation.
Implementation Details
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 show detailed pseudo codes of the policy enclave and the regular enclave(s) under our framework respectively. Using these algorithms, any generic FSM can be mapped to our framework to keep track of the application's execution ow.
For an application with N unique regular enclaves, the policy enclave initializes two null initialized arrays Counters and Nonce each of size N through the S P E procedure which also resets its internal FSM. e application, a er the initial setup, starts with calling its rst regular enclave. A er which, the R P E is always called before running a regular enclave with an identi er N extID and is provided with the report Report of the previously executed regular enclave identi ed by id. Report also contains a monotonically increasing counter c and a random nonce r (cf. Algorithm 2), the purpose of which will be explained in Section 4. Counters := {0} N Null initialized array.
3:
Nonce := {⊥} N Empty nonce array.
4:
FSM R ( ) 5: end procedure
id ← Report Extract sender ID.
3:
if V R (Report)== f alse then 4: Go to line 15.
5:
if (N extI D ∈ S) then Raise Exception.
16:
id ← R Extract sender ID.
r ← R Extract nonce.
4:
c ← R Extract counter. id ← Report Extract sender ID.
3:
r ← Report Extract nonce.
4:
c ← Report Extract counter.
5:
if (Counter c ∨ id Polic ID) then 6: Go to line 17 7: end if 8: Verify Report via EGETKEY
9:
if Veri cation Unsuccessful then 10: Go to line 17 11: end if
12:
Execute Application Functionality
13:
Counter + +
14:
R := EREPORT (·||r ||c) Raise Exception.
18:
return 19 : end procedure and a er executing the intended application functionality of the enclave, a new report is created using the last nonce and counter values and sent to the policy enclave for future use. Counter is incremented to keep track of the execution count of the enclave.
Security of the Proposed Framework
Asynchronous Exits ( AEX)
. So far we talked about enclaves voluntarily exiting, i.e., via the EEXIT instruction. However, the OS can swap out an enclave asynchronously whenever needed. Notice that the entry point to renter this enclave will only be available through the ERESUME instruction. If a compromised OS tries to execute some other enclave between AEX and ERESUME, it will fail the report veri cation step in R R E procedure since the policy enclave will not create a report for this enclave until the previously suspended enclave nishes its execution. is means that the system cannot proceed until the OS allows the suspended enclave (and the suspended enclave only) to run to completion, hence maintaining the sequential ordering of the program. e only other possibility is a denial of service a ack which is out of scope of this work (cf. Section 3).
Preventing Replay A acks.
Since an adversary may try to replay/re-execute a regular enclave more than once with and/or without executing the policy enclave in between (i.e., to bypass the policy checker), we introduce a random nonce r in the report creation process which binds two back to back executions of a policy and regular enclave.
When a policy enclave grants permission to run a regular enclave N extID, it embeds a random nonce in its report sent to enclave N extID and stores it a local array. When the N extID enclave enters, it rst expects a report from the policy enclave to be available, and Keynote Address II SACMAT'17, June 21-23, 2017, Indianapolis, IN, USA only executes if that is the case. When it nishes execution, it sends back a report to the policy enclave with the same random nonce embedded into it. Since the policy enclave expects the same random nonce, the veri cation succeeds. e adversary can try the following cases:
(1) If it tries to illegitimately run a regular enclave more than once without calling the policy enclave in between, then upon the second run of the regular enclave, the report from the policy enclave will not be available since it was not run again. Same goes for multiple consecutive runs of the policy enclave. (2) If it tries to run the combination of back to back executions of the policy and a regular enclave causing an execution ow that violates the normal behavior of the application, this would result in a empting an invalid transition in the FSM of the policy enclave. Consequently, an exception will be raised. (3) If it tries to replay an instance of a regular enclave from an older run together with an instance of policy enclave from a newer run, with both the instances having same counter values, then the random nonce comes into the picture and causes the veri cation to fail.
Preventing Tear down of
Enclaves. e compromised OS may tear down or destroy any enclave and recreate it to run from the start. In order to prevent this scenario, the policy enclave maintains a monotonically increasing counter for each regular enclave which is embedded in each report sent to the corresponding enclave. e regular enclave also maintains its execution count in an independent counter. Unless one of the two enclaves, namely the policy enclave and the regular enclave, is destroyed/reset, their independent counters remain consistent. As soon as one of these enclaves is destroyed/reset, the counters become inconsistent and this violation is detected. In the worst case, if the adversary resets all the enclaves at once, including the policy enclave, then this simply means running the whole application from start in a normal fashion.
Hence, by utilizing the isolation and a estation properties of modern secure processors, our framework allows an application programmer to design a simpli ed policy checker to not only perform standard authentication and access control tasks but also to verify the correct program control ow at a coarse module-level granularity. A centralized policy checker to enforce correct control ow is only made possible by the vital role played by the proposed wrappers and the design methodology for the secure enclaves.
APPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we show and discuss a couple of applications of our proposed framework which, when combined with programmer's intelligence, can prove to be a strong authentication and access control framework. We discuss the vulnerabilities in a transaction processing system (TPS) and how such cases can be dealt with using the proposed framework. Furthermore, we extend our discussion from a TPS to a distributed system se ing where multiple compute nodes communicate with each other and convey their execution states via the proposed scheme. 
Transaction Processing System
Access control systems perform identity veri cation/authentication, access approval, and accountability of entities via login credentials such as passwords, personal identi cation numbers (PINs), biometric scans, and physical or electronic keys. In the past, authentication was almost synonymous with password systems, but today's authentication system must do more. One potential example that requires strong authentication and access control protocol can be a transaction process which should be authenticated, atomic and consistent. Figure 4 shows a toy example of such a transaction processing system. Under normal conditions, the user inputs the request alongside its credentials to an authenticating entity which authenticates the user. Upon successful authentication, the user is granted permission to proceed with the request and execute a database query.
e database management system (DBMS) processes the query and returns the corresponding result to the user.
Notice that the application ow in the transaction process is being managed by the underlying operating system. If the OS gets compromised, there can be multiple events where it can ra le the system (as shown in Figure 2 ) by either re-ordering the execution, or bypassing multiple steps to disrupt the process.
Our framework deals with such problematic scenarios as follows. When the user generates a request, the policy enclave veri es the report generated by the user enclave. Upon veri cation, the request is forwarded to the authenticating enclave to authenticate the user credentials. If the authentication does not succeed, the user is not granted permission to continue, and the request is terminated a er the policy enclave updates its states for future requests. However, if the user authentication is successful then before accessing the database, rst the policy enclave is invoked again which veri es that the last enclave executed was actually the authentication enclave. If the OS grants the user an unauthorized access to execute a database query without proper authentication (i.e., without authenticating its access permissions) then the above mentioned veri cation will fail and an exception will be raised. As the policy enclave enforces the correct execution order, there exists no such scenario where a compromised OS can re-order the enclave execution sequence, neither can it skip the execution of some enclaves. Hence, maintaining proper authentication and access control guarantees. no longer passive players. Instead, they can undertake active roles to e ectively minimize energy consumption by communicating back and forth with the provider. Smart grids follow the policy of distributed systems where work is divided among multiple compute nodes (devices). ese devices communicate with each other to provide the nal response to end users. Numerous machines including sensing devices, smart meters, and control systems are expected to be in between the provider and end users to facilitate this two-way communication system in SG.
Smart Grid
In Section 5.1 we discussed how the proposed framework protects the transaction processing system via a stringent authentication and access control policy. Moving this discussion forward, consider a distributed system as shown in Figure 5 . In such a system, the compute nodes communicate and interact with each other in order to achieve a common goal. If one of the nodes gets compromised, it might access some con dential information of other nodes in the system, and/or inject faulty messages into the network, consequently disrupting the whole process. In case of a smart grid, this unauthorized entity can send fabricated messages [12] to the neighborhood devices in the grid. If the messages cannot be ltered and processed, the control center might ultimately be misled and make incorrect decisions such as incorrect load balancing. Such scenarios can prove to be dreadful.
Consider that the policy enclave designed by the application developer has a "logging" functionality as well to report its system status to the neighboring nodes. Even with such a policy enclave, without enforcing the enclave execution ordering, the compromised OS might bypass the policy enclave preventing it from reporting its (compromised) status via the logging mechanism to the neighboring nodes.
On the other hand, under our framework with the correct execution ordering enforced, if the OS tries to inject new packets into the network, e.g., by executing a network enclave, this would require the policy enclave to be executed rst (to maintain our framework's invariant). erefore, at this point, either the the policy enclave must be executed rst -which would result in reporting the compromised status log to the neighbors -or no "faulty" packets can be injected into the network. Communicating the log to the neighbors would allow them to suspend/ignore their future communications with the compromised node until that node is recovered.
MapReduce
When processing distributed data sets of extreme size, MapReduce [7] , as exempli ed by Apache Hadoop, is a commonly used framework, as it o ers a productive abstraction for large-scale multiprocessor data processing by hiding the complexity associated with fault tolerance, data movement, and work orchestration in a large computing environment.
e MapReduce framework is organized into three distinct operations: Map (a programmer-supplied program that emits key-value pairs), a Shu e (whereby the mapped pairs are grouped by key), and Reduce (a programmer-supplied script that processes the values grouped by key). A canonical "big data" example of MapReduce is a word count application: Map processes chunks of text input and emits (word, 1) for each word in the input, and a er Shu e groups these pairs by key, Reduce counts the number of values associated with each key to obtain a word count.
Consider a so ware adversary that seeks to subvert the execution. While an enclaved system cannot defend against a privileged denial of service, an a acker may seek to bias the computation by suppressing or falsifying keys during a shu e operation, or subverting the map or reduce nodes. e MapReduce controller (scheduler) is an unequivocally trusted component: the controller parcels out work to various nodes within a computing cluster, and orchestrates the communication streams (shu e) between Map and Reduce nodes. Enclaving the controller is not alone su cient to guard the MapReduce framework against a so ware adversary, however, as both the messages sent by the controller, and the mapper and reducer nodes must be authenticated and tied to trusted enclaved code. Even with individual nodes enclaved and therefore resistant to an adversary's a empts to tamper with the computation, MapReduce may be vulnerable to a capable adversary suppressing some key-value pairs during a shu e operation, or performing replay a acks.
Consider the policy enclave implementing the functions of a MapReduce controller, parceling out shares of input data to (enclaved) mapper nodes, which 1). authenticate the controller's messages, and 2) produce a certi cate a esting to the integrity of the result of the Map or Reduce operation. A so ware adversary is unable to defeat the integrity of the MapReduce controller (the policy enclave), and therefore cannot falsify the input partitioning or shu e. Should an adversary tamper with Map or Reduce enclaves, they would either not run or not produce a certi cate that authenticates their output, either being a failure, which the MapReduce framework is designed to tolerate.
A prudent system designer can extend this sketch to implement an augmented MapReduce, where the the mapper and reducer nodes enforce di erential privacy [9] , or aggregate secret datasets on behalf of multiple mutually distrusting entities.
e system composed of enclaves orchestrated and authenticated by the policy enclave acting as a MapReduce controller o ers a trusted, authenticated party that thwarts capable so ware adversaries and enforces high-level policies.
Discussion
Our framework opens up several other possibilities for richer application design. We discuss two of the possible improvements that can be made to the applications under this model.
Since the dynamic execution ow is guaranteed to be consistent with the application designer's intended control ow, one can extend the policy enclave to collect "behavioral" information about the regular enclaves running in the system. With some standard machine learning algorithms, the policy checker can be enhanced to incorporate multiple behavioral authentication factors resulting in dynamically adjusting to the program's behavior at run time. is can also be used to develop intelligent anomaly detection mechanisms. For instance, if a user/enclave starts reading unusually high amount of records from a database, this could potentially mean that this user is trying to replicate or clone the database and should be prevented from doing so.
e policy enclave can also be enriched by incorporating a logging mechanism for a distributed system se ing. With our model, for example, the stealthy logging mechanism from [2] can potentially be simpli ed since the adversary (e.g., the compromised OS) cannot directly access the reserved memory of the policy enclave where the system's log is stored.
CONCLUSION
We have proposed a so ware application design methodology that leverages the so ware isolation container (enclave) primitive offered by modern secure processors to enforce correct ow of execution within a sensitive application. With no required changes to modern hardware, our methodology allows the application designer to securely perform authentication and access control. We provide a comprehensive discussion of security of the proposed scheme in the presence of a privileged so ware adversary. In addition to thwarting an adversary a empting to circumvent application policy checks, our framework o ers the application designer a global view of application state via the policy checker enclave, which in turn enables high-level policies to be described and tailored for a given application.
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